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Chapter 3: Assessing vulnerability
3.1 What is vulnerability?
The impacts of climate variability affect everyone, and
there are few places in the world that will not be
affected by long-term climate change. There are major
differences though in the capacity to cope with those
impacts, depending on where they occur. The citizens
of London, New York or Sydney may feel aggrieved if
a prolonged drought means that they have to forego
washing their cars or watering their gardens. In the
shantytowns of Third World megacities, the impacts of
water scarcity are much more serious. Cramped and
crowded living conditions magnify the risks of disease
epidemics when polluted ponds or ditches become the
only available water sources. At the other climatic
extreme, low-cost houses on marginal land in flood
plains or on mountainsides are the first to go when
intense rainfall brings inundation and landslides. For
the poor, threats from extreme weather events are
compounded by the limited options they have to
respond.
There are other compounding factors too. Existing
water or food scarcity makes some regions more
sensitive to droughts and temperature rise; geographic
considerations are important when considering the
potential impact of sea level rise; and countries with
low levels of human and economic development also
have a reduced capacity to cope with the impacts of
climate variability and climate change.
It is clear that assessing the "vulnerability" of a
particular community, river basin or geographic region
to climate variability and climate change involves more
than long-range weather and climate prediction. It
means combining updated hydrological data with
appropriate sectoral, geographic and developmental
indicators. It is an exercise that ideally needs to be
based on local analysis of local data and a local
evaluation of adaptive capacity. A lot of work is going
on in different agencies to develop methodologies for
this "bottom-up approach" to vulnerability assessment.
Chapter 5 refers to the research being undertaken by
the World Bank, the Red Cross and the
UNEP/WMO/IPCC initiative Assessment of Impacts and
Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC). There are also
promising early results emerging from studies at the
Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) into a
"Climate Vulnerability Index" (CVI). Based on previous
developments  of the Water Poverty Index (Sullivan et
al, 2002),  the CVI allows a combination of variables
representing resources, access, capacity, use,
environment and geospatial conditions to be used,
according to the geographic types being compared
(e.g. small islands, mountainous regions, coastal zones,
megacities, arid and semi-arid areas). Figure 3.1 shows
some preliminary results of applying the CVI approach
in a top-down way to compare climate vulnerabilities
of different regions at present and  how it might be
affected over 30 years if development follows UNEP’s
"Policy First" scenario (see Section 3.2).  In Sections 3.3
and 3.6, we look further at the CVI methodology and
its application. 
While the CVI approach is promising, so far there is no
universally applicable way of comparing local
vulnerability from one location to another. One
recommendation of this report is for coordination and
consolidation of research efforts to develop and test
vulnerability indicators and assessment methods that
can be used by local groups. The DWC-sponsored
multi-stakeholder dialogues described in Chapter 5 are
seen as effective organizations to undertake local
vulnerability assessments.
In the meantime, the development community is
hungry for comparative data on critical regions or "hot
spots" in respect to climate change. Governments,
donors and NGOs want an overall indication of where
people are most at risk. This demand is being partly
met by combining the various IPCC climate change
scenarios with proxy indicators for the "adaptive
capacity" of different countries (working definitions of
the terms "sensitivity", "adaptive capacity" and
"vulnerability" are given in Box 3.1). The data can be
combined in many different ways, though all suffer
from the uncertainties and the spatial scale of the
climate change scenarios and the necessary averaging
of indicators over whole countries. Accepting these
limitations, we are showing here four different  cases
as examples of techniques for determining
vulnerability to climate change and/or variability. It is
Many different agencies and individuals have
contributed to the development of assessment
techniques for vulnerability to climate change and,
to a lesser degree, climate variability. A good
summary of the resulting plethora of terms (impact
potential, resilience, sensitivity, responsiveness,
adaptability, adaptive capacity and vulnerability) was
prepared by Olmos (CCKN, 2001). For this report, we
have confined the discussion to three principle
parameters, defined by IPCC (2001) as:
Sensitivity: the degree to which a system is affected,
either adversely or beneficially, by climate-related
stimuli;
Adaptive capacity: the ability of a system to adjust
to climate change (including climate variability and
extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take
advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the
consequences; and
Vulnerability: the degree to which a system is
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse
effects of climate change, including climate
variability and extremes. It is, amongst others,  a
function of the character, magnitude and rate of
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its
sensitivity and its adaptive capacity.
Box 3.1 Defining vulnerability
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by no means a complete compilation, but it does serve
to illustrate different types of results vulnerability
assessment methods can provide. The cases are:
1. Global Vulnerability and Critical Regions to Climate
Change – Water Stress
2. Sectoral Vulnerability to Climate Change – Food
Security
3. Geographic Vulnerability – Small Islands, Low
Coastal Areas and Megacities
4. Developmental Vulnerability – Millennium
Development Goals
3.2 The water stress index applied to climate
The concept of water stress is commonly used to
obtain a global overview of the state of water
resources, by comparing availability with demand.
‘Water stress’ is an indication of the amount of
pressure put on water resources and aquatic
ecosystems by the users. Generally speaking, the more
often water is withdrawn, used, and discharged back
to the river, the more it is degraded or depleted, and
the higher the water stress. The higher the water
stress, the stronger is the competition between users,
and the greater the limitation on further use of these
water resources downstream.
In developing countries, a level of severe water stress
indicates an intensive level of water use that is likely
to cause rapid degradation of water quality for
downstream users and absolute shortages during
droughts. Also, in both developing and industrialised
countries, a level of severe water stress indicates
strong competition for water resources during dry
Figure 3.1 Some preliminary results of applying the Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI) approach to compare vulnerabilities of different regions at present and how it
might be affected over 30 years if development follows UNEP’s "Policy First" scenario (Sullivan et al, 2003)
A typical measure of water stress is the annual
‘withdrawals to availability ratio’ (WTA).  According
to this indicator, water stress increases when either
water withdrawals grow (related to changes in
population and economic growth), and/or water
availability decreases (due to pollution or climate
change). This indicator has the advantage of being
transparent and computable for all basins, although
it implies a strong simplification of the processes of
water scarcity.  Results by Alcamo et al (2002)
presented in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1, Figs. 2.5 and 2.6)
assumed that river basins with a WTA  ratio greater
than 0.4 are under severe water stress. This value
was selected by the World Water Commission
(Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000) and a Consortium
of UN organizations (Raskin et al., 1997), based on
expert judgement, as an approximate threshold of
‘severe’ water stress and an indication of heavy
competition between water users. Water stress is
classified as ‘low’ (WTA lower than 0.2), ‘medium’
(WTA between 0.2 and 0.4), and ‘severe’ (WTA larger
than 0.4).
Box 3.2: Water stress as "withdrawal to availability ratio" 
years between municipalities, industry, and agriculture.
In most studies, severe water stress appears mainly in
arid areas of the world, but it also occurs in the more
humid drainage basins of the world. 
As part of the 1997 Water Futures: "Comprehensive
Assessment of Freshwater Water Resources of the
World", Raskin et al. (1997) define three components
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which contribute to
their water stress
indicators: Reliability
(R), Use to Resource
Ratio (U/Rr), and
Economic Coping
Capacity (ECC).  Two
indices are proposed:
Water Stress 1 (WS1):
The average of the
three individual
components.
Water Stress 2 (WS2):
The maximum value of
any of the three
components.
The introduction of
Economic Coping
Capacity is significant,
emphasising that the
stress is greater when
the capacity to cope is
less. In the case of water
stress composite 1 (WS1),
coping capacity
compensates for greater resource stress.
Results of Raskin’s et al. assessments suggest that in
2025, water stress will in most cases either be reduced
or stay the same due to population and economic
changes. Calculations based on projections of climate
change and development to the year 2025, reveal that
of the 160 countries analysed, 116 remain the same, 34
exhibit a decrease, and only 10 countries exhibit an
increase in water stress (WS2)  in 2025. A sample of
these countries is shown in Table 3.1. 
When the composite value of water stress is determined
as an average of the three components (WS1), there are
only seven countries that exhibit an increase in water
stress; the rest do not change in status from 1995.
Any water stress calculations need to be based on
assumptions about future driving forces which include
population growth, economic growth, technological
change and other socio-economic data. To allow for
comparisons between different modelling studies or
between regions, these drivers would normally be
derived from more general "|world evolution"
scenarios. The four "story lines" (A1, A2, B1, B2)
developed by IPCC –SRES (see section 1.5.3) are typical
examples of evolutionary paths used in many climate
vulnerability studies, including the study by Alcamo et
al (2002) as reported in Chapter 2 ( section 2.1, Figs.
2.5 and 2.6).
Other developmental scenarios are suggested in the
GEO-3 report (UNEP, 2000 and 2002) (see Box 3.3). As
shown in Section 3.3, Sullivan et al (2002) propose to
use UNEP scenarios in developing and evaluating the
Climate Vulnerability Index. 
3.3 Climate Vulnerability Index 
To make it possible to focus on the impacts of climate
change and variability, Sullivan et al (2003) extended
the Water Poverty Index concept (Sullivan, 2002) to
come up with a Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI). The
CVI score is on a scale of 0 to 100 (100 being the
highest vulnerability). It is generated from six major
components, each of which can include several
variables1. An example of its application at the global
level was given at the start of this chapter and a more
localised application is described in section 3.6.
Table 3.1. A comparison of water stress for 1995 and 2025 for selected countries according to "Comprehensive Assessment of
Freshwater Water Resources of the World", ( Raskin et al., 1997). Calculations for 2025 are based on the GFDL climate scenario,
and mean Conventional Development Scenario. 
Algeria
Denmark
Morocco
Netherlands
South Africa
USA
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chad
Mozambique
Fiji Islands
Papua New
Guinea
Ukraine
Russia
Country 1995 2025 WS2 Change
1995-2025
R
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
U/Rr
3
1
3
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
ECC
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
1
4
4
3
3
3
3
WS2
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
3
1
4
4
4
3
3
3
R
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
U/Rr
4
2
4
2
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
ECC
2
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
1
4
4
2
2
2
2
WS2
4
3
4
3
4
3
2
3
1
4
4
2
2
2
2
increase
increase
increase
increase
increase
increase
no change
no change
no change
no change
no change
decrease
decrease
decrease
decrease
1. See also section 3.6, where CVI is applied to selected small islands by way of a
scoping study. CVI component values are derived from the equivalent WPI
components, with a Geospatial component added. For the small island case
study, this is a combination of an isolation index (based on distance from the
mainland and land area) and the extent of land at risk from sea level rise
(approximately estimated from available topographic maps). The changes in
the components were based on the UNEP "Policy First" scenario, and
estimated as follows:
Resources – change in runoff from IPCC (2001b, page 202) based on model
results generated from the HadCM3 global climate model, combined with
changed populations using annual growth rates derived from WRI (2000). A
small arbitrary change in variability is also assumed.
Access – based on change in access to safe water assuming the UN Millennium
target for 2015 is met, and then that the same target is applied again and
met again. The target is to half the proportion of people without access; thus
by 2030, the proportion of people without access would be 25% of the value
in 2000.
Capacity – based on the combination of change in under-5 mortality rates and
GDP, with equal weight given to each. For under-5 mortality rates the
Millennium target is used in the same way as for Access. The target is to
reduce the rates by two-thirds; thus by 2030, the rates would be 11% of the
2000 value. It is assumed that GDPs stay the same in comparative terms
between the countries.
Use – is changed only by the ratio of change in population.
Environment – the natural capital index values from GEO-3 (UNEP, 2002) for
the region or sub-region are used.
Geospatial – an additional component of the CVI, not part of the Water
Poverty Index. See Box 3.6 for the Geospatial elements associated with Small
Islands.
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CVI extends the Water Poverty Index (WPI) by adding a
new component of geographical vulnerability, referred
to as the geospatial component. This brings in extra
variables related to specific geographical situations.
Geographic vulnerability to climatic impacts can be
characterised in many different ways. It can refer to
the likelihood of being subject to floods or droughts,
land slips or desertification. It may be to do with
topography, or isolation, or many other factors. In any
particular situation, potential geographical
vulnerability has to be identified on the basis of
informed judgement and expert opinion. 
In calculating the CVI, each of the major components
used to characterise WPI  (Resource, Access, Capacity,
Use and Environment) needs to be included, but the
sub-components or variables are selected on the basis
of their particular relevance to the assessment of
vulnerability to climate variability. As an example,
some sub-components that may be appropriate for the
CVI are listed in Table 3.2. The actual choice of the sub-
components for a particular application also depends
on the availability of data and the scale of the study;
different variables are available and relevant at
different spatial scales.
Markets First
Most of the world adopts the values and expectations
prevailing in today’s industrialized countries. The wealth
of nations and the optimal play of market forces
dominate social and political agendas. Trust is placed in
further globalization and liberalization to enhance
corporate wealth, create new enterprises and
livelihoods, and so help people and communities to
afford to insure against – or pay to fix – social and
environmental problems. Ethical investors, together
with citizen and consumer groups, try to exercise
growing corrective influence but are undermined by
economic imperatives. The powers of state officials,
planners and lawmakers to regulate society, economy
and the environment continue to be overwhelmed by
expanding demands.
 Policy First
Decisive initiatives are taken by governments in an
attempt to reach specific social and environmental
goals. A coordinated pro-environment and anti-poverty
drive balances the momentum for economic
development at any cost. Environmental and social costs
and gains are factored into policy measures, regulatory
frameworks and planning processes. All these are
reinforced by fiscal levers or incentives such as carbon
taxes and tax breaks. International ‘soft law’ treaties
and binding instruments affecting environment and
development are integrated into unified blueprints and
their status in law is upgraded, though fresh provision is
made for open consultation processes to allow for
regional and local variants.
 Security First
This scenario assumes a world of striking disparities
where inequality and conflict prevail. Socio-economic
and environmental stresses give rise to waves of protest
and counteraction. As such troubles become increasingly
prevalent, the more powerful and wealthy groups focus
on self-protection, creating enclaves akin to the present
day ‘gated communities’. Such islands of advantage
provide a degree of enhanced security and economic
benefits for dependent communities in their immediate
surroundings but they exclude the disadvantaged mass
of outsiders. Welfare and regulatory services fall into
disuse but market forces continue to operate outside
the walls.
 Sustainability First
A new environment and development paradigm
emerges in response to the challenge of sustainability,
supported by new, more equitable values and
institutions. A more visionary state of affairs prevails,
where radical shifts in the way people interact with one
another and with the world around them stimulate and
support sustainable policy measures and accountable
corporate behaviour. There is much fuller collaboration
between governments, citizens and other stakeholder
groups in decision-making on issues of close common
concern. A consensus is reached on what needs to be
done to satisfy basic needs and realize personal goals
without beggaring others or spoiling the outlook for
posterity.
Box 3.3 UNEP development  scenarios
CVI component Sub-components / Variables
Resource (R)  assessment of surface water and groundwater 
availability
 evaluation of the reliability of resources
 assessment of water quality
 dependence on imported or desalinated water
 water storage capacity
Access (A)  access to clean water
 access to sanitation
 access to irrigation coverage adjusted by climate 
characteristics
Capacity (C )  expenditure on consumer durables, or income
 the under-five mortality rate
 existence of disaster warning systems
 educational level of the population
 percentage of people living in informal housing 
 GDP as a proportion of GNP
 strength of municipal institutions 
 investment in the water sector as a percentage 
of fixed capital investment
 access to a place of safety in the event of 
flooding or other disasters
Use (U)  domestic water consumption rate related to 
national or other standards
 agricultural water use related to the contribution 
of agricultural production to GDP
 industrial water use related to the contribution 
of industrial production to GDP
Environment (E)  livestock density
 human population density
 loss of habitats
 flood frequency
Geospatial (G)  extent of land at risk from sea level rise and/or 
tidal waves
 extent of land at risk from land slips
 degree of isolation from other water resources 
and/or food sources
 deforestation, desertification and/or soil erosion rates
 degree of land conversion from natural vegetation
 extent of risk from melting of glaciers
 risk of glacial lake outbursts
Table 3.2 Potential variables for inclusion as sub-components of the Climate
Vulnerability Index (Sullivan et al, 2003)
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In its simplest form, the CVI would be the average of
the six component indices. In most cases though, the
components need to be weighted to reflect the
relative risk of each one being impacted by climate
variability or climate change. That is done by
multiplying each component by a different risk factor
then dividing them by the sum of the factors.
The resulting CVI score for the present situation gives a
measure of vulnerability to climate variability now, and
allows comparisons between locations. By using
scenarios of future conditions, the change in the scores
from the present values provides comparative
assessment of the vulnerability to climate change (see
Figure 3.1). 
3.4 Critical regions of water stress
vulnerability
A modelling study by Alcamo and Heinrichs (2002)
determined "critical regions" based on four different
sets of criteria, and four distinctive socio-economic and
climate scenarios.  It is best viewed as a type of sensitivity
analysis for identifying particularly sensitive regions, and
not as a substitute for detailed assessment of global
change impacts in a particular region.
The analysis compares the change in water withdrawals
caused by changes in population, economic growth, and
technological change, with the change in water
availability (the natural discharge in each watershed)
caused by long-term, average changes in precipitation
and temperature due to climate change (only annual
average changes). Water stress is rated as low, medium
or high according to the "annual withdrawals-to-
availability ratio" (see Box 3.2). Critical regions are
identified as those that experience an increase in water
stress on the watershed-level over the modelled period.
The results have been categorised according to four sets
of criteria for "critical regions" (note these are not
mutually exclusive criteria sets, just alternative ways of
presenting the results)
1. Watersheds already under "severe water stress" and
experiencing any increase in stress, regardless of the
rate of this future increase;
2. Watersheds already under "severe water stress", and
where the stress will increase at least one percent per
year.  The assumption here is that society and
ecosystems can adapt to a rate of increase of water
stress of up to one percent per year without major
disruptions
3. Watersheds already experiencing "medium or severe
water stress", and where additional water stress will
be at least one percent per year. 
4. Watersheds already experiencing "medium water
stress", and where the water stress will increase at
least one percent per year. In addition, these
watersheds must be located in regions/countries with
a "higher susceptibility category".
The susceptibility criterion in 4 is an attempt to
account for the adaptive capacity of the local
population and ecosystems. While susceptibility
depends on a complex web of technical, social,
economic, cultural, and other factors that are difficult
to represent globally, the Human-Development Index2
(UNDP, 1997) is used in this study as a proxy variable.
The ‘high susceptibility’ category is defined as those
countries having a HDI in 1995 less than 0.80.
As might be expected, the estimate of critical regions
is very scenario-dependent, showing smaller areas
under scenarios having smaller increases in water
stress. Some regions though always appear as critical
regardless of the scenario. These include small parts of
central Mexico, the Middle East, the Ganges-Indus
region, the Chad region and parts of the Algerian
coast. 
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of major regions that
fall into the critical category according to the different
sets of criteria. Here the A2 IPCC scenario (see section
1.5.3) for the 2020s and the ECHAM (Max Planck
Institute, Hamburg, Germany) climate model data set is
used. As well as showing the major critical regions, the
total percentage of critical regions worldwide has
been calculated. The highest values are according to
criteria set 3. Europe in particular shows very high
values for these criteria, which take no account of the
susceptibility criterion. Including the HDI-based
susceptibility criterion (criteria set 4) virtually
eliminates the "critical regions" from the industrialised
part of the world, while it has a little or no effect on
Africa and Asia.
2 The aim of the HDI is to give a broader indication of the state of human well-
being than the traditional measure of gross national product (GNP). GNP is
nevertheless included as one of HDI’s three components, the other two being
the rates of literacy and infant mortality.
CRITERIA SET
Major World Regions 1 2 3 4
Africa 7.6 4.3 10.6 10.6
Asia 19.8 9.7 24.2 23.8
Australia & Oceania 4.1 0.2 4.2 0.0
FSU 3.3 0.2 9.6 6.1
Latin America 6.9 4.0 8.4 4.4
North America 6.4 1.9 18.1 0.0
Europe 18.3 11.8 41.6 0.5
Table 3.3 Percentage of major regions that fall into the critical category
according to different sets of criteria under the A2 scenario for the 2020s
based on the ECHAM climate data set.
Figure 3.2 shows where the critical regions are
according to criteria set 4 and for the same set of
climate scenarios as the results in Table 3.3.
Comparison with Figure 2.6 (Chapter 2) shows again
how consideration of coping capacity influences both
the global extent and the distribution of critical
regions. 
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3.5 Sectoral vulnerability: food security 
Agriculture is the world’s biggest water consumer and
climate variability is farmers' greatest challenge today.
Natural variability of rainfall, temperature and other
weather conditions is the main factor influencing
variability in agricultural production and food
insecurity (FAO, 2001)3 . 
Climate extremes - violent and unusual events such as
floods and storms - though by nature more apparently
dramatic, have less overall effect on agricultural
production than chronic climate deficiencies such as
droughts. As with other issues, the uncertainties
involved in modelling future climate variability on the
right spatial and temporal scales make it difficult to
simulate the vulnerability of food production on a
country-by-country basis.  
3.5.1 Current food-insecure countries
The FAO has estimated the total number of
undernourished people in 99 developing countries at
780 million (FAO, 2001). Fifteen of these countries,
mainly in the Middle East, North Africa, and South
America, have relatively high levels of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita – more than US$3,000. These
countries, accounting for about 1% of the total
undernourished, are not considered to be vulnerable
on a national scale, as their adaptive capacity is high.
The total population of the remaining 84 food-
insecure countries at present amounts to some 
4.2 billion, equivalent to 74% of the current world
population, of which some 18% are undernourished
(Fischer et al., 2002). By the 2080s, the UN projects the
total population of these countries to increase to 
6.8 billion equivalent to 80% of the world 
population. 
More than half of the undernourished people (61%)
are in Asia, while sub-Saharan Africa accounts for
almost a quarter (24%). In terms of the proportion of
the regional population deemed to be
undernourished, the biggest percentage is in sub-
Saharan Africa, where 34% were undernourished in
1997-99. Asia and the Pacific comes next with 16%
undernourished. It is important to note that significant
progress has been made over the last two decades: the
incidence of undernourishment in developing
countries has come down from 29% in 1979-81 to 17%
in 1997-99 (FAO, 2002).
Based on modelling of climate-change scenarios by
Fischer et al. (2002), the full group of food-insecure
countries, show a net loss of up to 2% in rain-fed
cereal production in four of the 12 scenarios4.
Individual country results give more reason for concern
Figure 3.2 Regions of critical water stress (Alcamo and Heinrich, 2002)
3 http://www.fao.org/NEWS/1997/971201-e.htm 4 For HadCM3 and CSIRO (Australian) climate models
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in that up to 40 countries, with a total population in
the range of 1–3 billion may lose on average 10–20 %
of their cereal production potential in the 2080s due
to climate change.
3.5.2 Food-insecure countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Fischer et al. (2002) show that Sudan, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Zimbabwe, Chad, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique,
and Niger lose cereal production potential in the
2080s5 for three climate models and across all the
emission scenarios. These countries currently have 87
million undernourished, equivalent to 45% of the 
total undernourished in sub-Saharan Africa. In
contrast, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, 
Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and
Guinea all gain cereal production potential in the
2080s. These eight gaining countries currently have 
73 million undernourished, equivalent to 38% of 
the undernourished population in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The balance of gaining and losing countries
demonstrates two important factors. First, the net
balance of changes in cereal-production potential for
sub-Saharan Africa will very likely be negative, with
net losses of up to 12% of the region’s current
production potential. Second, there will be large
variations from country to country, with as many as
40% of sub-Saharan countries losing a substantial part
of their agricultural production.
3.6 Geographic vulnerability:  
small islands, low-lying coastal areas 
and megacities
3.6.1 Small Islands
The global top-down approaches for assessing
vulnerability to climate change do not have the
resolution to capture the dynamics occurring at smaller
scales.  It is quite apparent, however, that small island
nations and low-lying coastal areas face particular
challenges in terms of climate change. The 2001 IPCC
Report offers a daunting assessment of the
vulnerability and adaptive capacity of Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) to climate change and climate
variability. The report notes that, because the adaptive
capacity of human systems in SIDS is generally low and
vulnerability high, they are likely to be among the
countries most seriously impacted by climate change.
IPCC cautions that islands with very limited water
supplies are highly vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change on the water balance. 
In discussing the special circumstances of SIDS, IPCC
(2001) points out that, although they are not a
homogeneous group, they share many common
features that increase their vulnerability to the
projected impacts of climate change. The common
characteristics include:
– their small physical size and the fact that they are
surrounded by large expanses of ocean;
Figure 3.3 Country-level climate-change impacts on rain-fed cereal-production potential on currently cultivated land (HadCM3- A1FI, 2080s) (Fischer et al, 2002).
5 With the exception of the results for the NCAR-PCM model
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Figure 3.4 Additional number of undernourished due to climate change, by
region, for socio economic conditions of the SRES A2 scenario in the 2080s
(Fischer et al, 2002).
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– limited natural resources, many of which are
already stressed;
– proneness to natural disasters and extreme events;
– relatively thin fresh water lenses that are highly
sensitive to sea-level changes;
– in some cases, relative isolation and great distance
to major markets;
– extreme openness of small economies and high
sensitivity to external market shocks;
– large populations with high growth rates and
densities;
– poorly developed infrastructure;
– limited funds, human resources and skills.
A wide range of hazards have the potential to impact
on water in SIDS, including droughts, floods, tropical
cyclones and sea level rise. Agricultural drought is a
particular problem for the Pacific atoll nations and the
leeward side of larger islands. The most vulnerable
communities are impoverished peoples occupying
marginal rural and urban environments (ESCAP, 2000). 
Floods are a significant hazard in those Pacific Island
countries with mountainous terrain. Examples of
recent flooding examples in the Pacific Islands are
given in Box 3.4. The hazard is greatest when these
islands are in the zone affected by cyclones and their
associated extreme precipitation intensities. Floods can
result in loss of life and extensive property damage,
especially when river floodplains have been settled
and/or cultivated. In cyclone conditions, the effects of
floods are often exacerbated by high-intensity rain-
This range of hazards has been demonstrated in
recent flooding in various Pacific Island countries:
in 1986 Cyclone Namu caused widespread property
damage in the Solomon Islands and floods which
resulted in the destruction of several highway
bridges and the loss of river flow monitoring sites.
in 1987 Cyclone Uma hit Vanuatu where it was
reported as being the worst cyclone in living memory
in South Efate. The resulting widespread damage
included the destruction of hydrological stations.
in 1991 Cyclone Val devastated the islands of
American Samoa. Water supplies were adversely
affected when flooding caused by the accumulation
of debris resulted in the inundation of wellheads.
in 2001 flash floods in Samoa (Upolu) caused by
extreme rainfall intensities associated with an
unpredictable micro-weather system resulted in
widespread damage including the contamination of
potable water supplies and destruction of river flow
monitoring sites. 
Typhoon Chata’an in 2002 completely destroyed or
badly damaged all 11 flow monitoring sites in the
Guam streamgauge network.
(Falkland et al., 2002)
Box 3.4 Examples of major flood events and impacts in the 
Pacific Islands 
Tropical cyclones are damaging for low-lying islands
particularly where changes in land use practices have
tended to reduce the natural resilience of
subsistence life styles and increased the risk of soil
erosion:
In 1980 Cyclone Ofa caused extensive damage to the
atoll islands of Tokelau.
Public buildings and houses were extensively
damaged, gardens and tree crops were destroyed,
and inundation of sea-water washed away or
contaminated the remaining topsoil.
Cyclone Ofa also caused devastation in both Samoa
and American Samoa where the widespread
property damage was exacerbated by flooding
problems resulting from the accumulation of debris
in streambeds.
In 1983 a sequence of five cyclones which struck
French Polynesia had a devastating effect on many
atoll villagers with storm surge conditions
submerging or totally removing some villages.
Groundwater resources were contaminated by
seawater inundation, boats and fishing equipment
were destroyed and vegetation and tree crops were
extensively damaged. 
In Pohnpei (Federated States of Micronesia) large-
scale forest clearing for commercial kava plantations
resulted in massive landslides after a severe cyclone
in 1997. The landslides caused loss of life, ruined
plantations, and damaged coastal coral reef
communities.
(Falkland et al., 2002)
Box 3.5 Cyclones in the Pacific 
induced landslides and resulting debris that can
obstruct river channels and create potentially
hazardous temporary dams. The hazards that floods
present to any structure also threaten water supply
infrastructure (e.g. damage to intake works, treatment
plants or distribution networks) and river flow
monitoring stations. Floods can also threaten water
supplies in a less direct way by compromising water
quality. 
Tropical cyclones are a serious hazard in most Pacific
Island countries but are more frequent in the western
and central Pacific than in the eastern Pacific. The very
high wind speeds of tropical cyclones are often
accompanied by extremely intense rainfall and storm
surge that is likely to be amplified by the associated
low atmospheric pressures. This combination can result
in destruction of buildings and gardens, damage to
tree crops, flooding, coastal inundation, and erosion,
pollution of water supplies and destruction of coral
reefs. 
Global warming is projected to bring more frequent
and more intense storms to higher latitudes of the
Pacific Islands region. In the near future, increased
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storminess is projected for a region extending north
and east of Hawaii to the area north of Micronesia
and westward to the North Mariana Islands. It will
become even stormier later in the century and
encompass Hawaii, Micronesia and the Marshall
Islands.
The potentially catastrophic effect of sea level rise on
small islands has often\ been pointed out. Many islands
have most of their land less than 3 to 4m above
present mean sea level, and even on islands with
higher elevations most of the settlements, economic
activity and infrastructure are at or near the coast
(Sullivan et al., 2002). Thus, sea level rise is expected to
have a disproportionately large impact on economies
and societies of many small islands (Lal et al., 2002).
The results of a sea level rise assessment in the
Caribbean are given in Box 3.6.
Application of the Climate Vulnerability Index (CVI) to
Small Islands
Illustration of the CVI approach for small islands (see
Box 3.7) draws on Water Poverty Index (WPI) data at
the national level in Lawrence et al. (2003). 
Preliminary component and CVI values for the present
situation (2000) and for the year 2030 for four small
island countries are shown in Table 3.4, following the
UNEP Policy First scenario (see Box 3.3).  A number of
approximations and simplifying assumptions have been
made to generate these data, so the values must be
treated as an illustration only. The Policy First scenario
is used because the conditions of this scenario allow us
to assume that the Millennium Goals on access to safe
water and on health (massive reductions in under-5
mortality) are met. In addition, this means that the
Access and Capacity components of the CVI index 
(see Table 3.2) improve enormously in the poorer
countries (Comoros and Trinidad), while in the 
others they do not change much, as they are already
good.
Overall, the results show that the poorest country,
Comoros, is the most vulnerable under present
conditions. In the future, the results indicate that it
will remain the most vulnerable, but the increase in
vulnerability for the other countries will be much
larger. This is especially so for Bahrain, where there is a
relatively large amount of land at risk from sea level
rise, resources decline due to population growth and
the environmental situation worsens. For other
scenarios, in which Millennium Goals would not be
met, vulnerabilities would show a larger increase in all
cases.
Unfortunately, no data were available for the most
vulnerable islands – the smallest and most low-lying
ones. It is clear that such places would have high CVI
values already, and that they would tend to increase,
primarily due to increasing populations often
concentrated into the risk areas and the projected
increase in variability in climate, rather than because
of major shifts in total rainfall amounts. In areas where
mean rainfalls are projected to decline, or where
droughts are expected to intensify, the vulnerability of
water resources in the smaller islands would be
expected to be even higher.
IPCC’s predictions that many coastal areas are likely
to experience increased levels of flooding,
accelerated erosion, loss of wetlands and mangroves
and saltwater intrusions into freshwater sources, are
supported by the results of the coastal vulnerability
assessments that were conducted at select sites in
Barbados, Guyana and Grenada6. 
For Guyana, the assessment noted that agriculture,
human settlements, infrastructure, fisheries and
water resources were likely to be significantly
affected by sea level rise (SLR), due to erosion,
inundation and salinisation. Under certain SLR
scenarios, there could be inundation of up to 150m
inland in the capital (Georgetown) and Onverwagt.
The intrusion of brackish water into the upper
reaches of Demerara, Mahaica and Essequibo Rivers
has also been predicted, posing serious consequences
for agriculture, with the prime agricultural lands
being seriously affected. In the Georgetown area, it
may be necessary to retreat up to 5km inland to
avoid the consequences of SLR. 
The assessment for Grenada found that the most
significant impacts of SLR would be on human
settlements and coastal infrastructure, tourism and
water resources. According to one scenario (1m SLR
by 2100) the beaches at all sites will disappear and
there will be significant inundation of coastal
infrastructure.
A combination of the same scenario with the added
impact of a storm surge from a Category 2 Hurricane
is likely to flood homes, businesses and other social
and economic infrastructure in all the sites 
studied. 
For Barbados, tourism, human settlements and water
supply were shown to be extremely susceptible to
SLR. With respect to biophysical impact, erosion and
inundation were ranked as a more pressing concern
than salinisation. Direct damage from storms plus
beach erosion could devastate tourism. The results of
the assessment indicated that virtually the entire
south and south-west coasts of the island will be
exposed to elevated water levels during a 1:100 year
storm and extensive flooding of these areas can be
expected.
Box 3.6 Sea Level Rise Assessment for three islands in the 
Caribbean (CEHI, 2002) 
6 The assessment was done using the methodology outlines in UNEP’s
Handbook on Methods of Climate Change Impact Assessment and Adaptation
Strategies.
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3.6.2 Coastal areas 
Low-lying coastal areas are highly vulnerable to
climate change and increasing climate variability. They
are particularly sensitive to sea level rise and flooding
from storm surges. These two impacts are closely
linked. Hay (2002) points out that sea level rise will
significantly increase the frequency of extreme surge
events in countries with low deltaic plains (Bangladesh,
the Netherlands, Egypt, etc). 
In Bangladesh there are other compounding factors
too. Land subsidence means that the global average
sea level rise of 1-2mm/year actually means a 4-
8mm/year relative rise over the last 22 years in
Bangladesh (Hay, 2002). If, due to climate change, the
strength of the south-west monsoon increases,
Bangladesh’s already formidable flood problems will
be substantially magnified. Ali and Hoque (1994) show
that, for a discharge rate equivalent to the 1988
floods, a 2m/s increase in wind speed almost doubles
the amount of water impounded in the country and
the backwater effect would result in the water level in
the flooded area rising by 22cm in a day. Global
warming and El Niño add yet another dimension.
Using findings by Emmanuel (1987) that tropical
cyclone intensity increases by 10% and 22% for sea
surface temperature rises of 2°C and 4°C respectively,
Ali (1996) showed that storm surge heights would in
turn increase by 21% and 47% leading to inland
penetration going up by 13% and 31%. 
Modelling studies reported by Nicholls et al (1997)
sought to estimate how the number of people
affected by flooding would rise for a particular sea-
level rise scenario. The national-scale model took into
account present coastal elevation, subsidence, storm
surge characteristics, and trends in coastal population
density. The standard of flood protection was
represented by using GNP per capita as a proxy. Sea
level rise was estimated using the Hadley Centre
climate model and ice melt contributions from IPCC
(1995, IS92a scenario). That meant a total rise by the
2080s of 44cm. It is important to note that in this
Table 3.4   Preliminary CVI values from national data for some small island States (Sullivan et al, 2003)
From the discussions  in Section 3.3 it is clear that small islands will have some special aspects of vulnerability. These can be
expressed in the Geospatial component of the CVI by the following variables:
Extent of land at risk from sea level rise. This could be the amount of land that is less than a certain height (1 m, say) above
mean sea level, expressed as the proportion of the total land area. The land area at risk is the zone near the shore, so this
variable reflects vulnerability to sea level rise. This factor is sometimes directly related to water resources, for instance, when the
land under threat contains freshwater lenses that are used for water supply. However, even when this is not the case, the
amount of low-lying land is a major factor in the general vulnerability of small islands. In the worst cases, some of the smallest
and most low-lying islands (atolls), this factor could be over-riding with the risk of the near total loss of a nation’s habitable
land. This variable also reflects the increased vulnerability to tsunamis associated with sea level rise and changing storm intensity.
Population in the zone at risk from sea level rise, expressed as the proportion of the total population. This is complementary to
the preceding factor. It reflects the fact that the population, and also infrastructure and economic activity, are not uniformly
distributed, but tend to be concentrated in the lower areas. Inclusion of this factor reflects the greater vulnerability that would
often occur because of most of the population being in the risk areas. Even islands with mountainous interiors may be found to
be highly vulnerable when looked at in this way because people and economic activities are concentrated near the coast.
Isolation index. This is constructed from both the distance to the nearest continental land mass or island group above a certain
size, and from the land area of the island (or island group) itself. The smallness of an island gives a measure of the lack of
options for water resources. Very small islands, which may be dependent on only a single freshwater lens, are the most
vulnerable. Even islands which have conventional surface water supplies are vulnerable because of their small size; any changes
are likely to be critical because there may be no other options (e.g. nearby catchments with different resource characteristics)
that could be used as a back-up. Similarly distance from other land limits the options both in terms of alternative water
resources and economics.
Dependence on water storage. This could be expressed as the amount of storage in relation to the annual demands. As many
small islands have limited water resources, few alternatives sources, and may be subject to high degrees of variability, the
amount of storage is a good indicator of how they might be able to reduce vulnerability.
Box 3.7 Possible Geospatial variables for Small Island Nations
Summary - values R A C U E G CVI
Bahrain 2000 94.2 3.0 13.1 63.6 45.6 54.7 47.0
2030 107.8 0.8 10.2 82.6 58.2 54.7 52.7
Barbados 2000 67.8 0.0 10.2 46.3 45.6 58.7 41.0
2030 78.5 0.0 8.8 53.6 53.2 58.7 44.5
Comoros 2000 69.6 62.0 43.7 57.2 45.6 66.7 58.8
2030 84.2 15.5 31.1 86.5 58.6 66.7 58.5
Trinidad & Tobago 2000 58.0 12.0 23.0 58.4 53.8 44.3 42.0
2030 68.0 3.0 19.7 67.5 62.8 44.3 44.2
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model there was no allowance for the type of changes
in storm surge frequency or intensity projected by Hay
(2002) and Ali (1996).
The results showed that, even without sea level rise,
population growth and subsidence would raise the
numbers of people flooded each year from 10 million
in the 1990s to 30 million in the 2080s. With the 44cm
projected sea level rise and no extra flood protection,
that figure would grow by a factor of seven to more
than 200 million at risk. Increasing flood protection in
line with projected GNP growth has a big effect on the
numbers, but the number of people at risk still grows
to 250% of the 1990 value, meaning 70-80 million at
risk. Figure 3.5 shows the coastal areas most at risk.
The rising sea level is also a major threat to coastal
wetlands (saltmarshes, mangroves and intertidal
areas), submerging them for progressively longer
periods in the tidal cycle. There are compensating
elements, as greater siltation raises the base level of
the wetlands and there can also be an inward
migration of the wetlands if the coastal topography
allows it. Using the same scenarios as for the flood-risk
modelling, Nicholls et al (1997) modelled wetlands
losses in relation to coastal morphology and
population density. They presumed too that better
living standards and care for the environment would
bring down present trends of coastal wetland losses
from 1% a year in the 1990s to a constant 0.4% a year
after 2020. That implied a loss without sea level rise of
37% by the 2080s. The 44cm sea level rise boosts that
figure by a further 25%, meaning that approaching
half of the world’s coastal wetlands would be lost by
the 2080s. There is a significant regional variation in
vulnerability to wetlands losses. Most sensitive are the
Atlantic coasts of North and Central America and the
shores of the Mediterranean and the Baltic. The
vulnerability comes mainly from their low tidal ranges
and limited potential for inland wetland migration.
3.6.3 Megacities
Rapid urban population growth, exacerbated by rural-
to-urban migration, is a major developmental
challenge for developing countries. In terms of water
resources, the escalating demands for water for
people, food and industry are frequently made worse
by the contamination of available resources that
results from inadequate sanitation and wastewater
treatment. 
We began this chapter by emphasising the special
vulnerability of the urban poor to the destructive
impacts of storms, floods and droughts. Inadequate
basic water and sanitation services and fragile rain-fed
farming systems mean that there is very little resilience
to climatic extremes. 
In 1950 only 18% of people in developing countries
lived in cities. In 2000 the proportion was 40%, and by
2030 the developing world will be 56% urban
(Brockherrhof, 2000). While urban populations in the
industrialised nations are growing at 0.4%, the
average growth rate in the cities of the developing
world is 2.3%, with Africa experiencing a rate of
4.2%.
The proportion of people living in very large urban
agglomerations or ‘megacities’ (cities of at least 10
million people) is growing all the time. In 2000, 3.7 per
cent of the world population resided in cities of 10
million inhabitants or more and by 2015 that
Ennore creek, Tamil Nadu, India: A compact
overview of coastal zone problems. In the
foreground traditional fishing boats that operate in
the creek. Next dredgers that clear the mouth of
the creek from silt that is deposited after a new
port was constructed further north. Dredging is
required because the new power plant in the
background takes its cooling water from the creek.
Once the dredging stops water quality problems in
the creek build up affecting the fishermen.
The design of coastal engineering works to halt
siltation at the mouth of the creek should take into
consideration the various users of the creek and its
surroundings as well as erosion problems in the
vicinity of the creek. An example of which can be
seen below.
Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India: Erosion at Royapuram
caused by Chennai Harbour. Effects of erosion
include the loss of valuable land and coastal
infrastructure, the relocation of coastal population
and damage to the sewage outfall (in background
of the picture). Climate change impacts are likely to
aggravate the problems experienced and amplify
the call for action
(after S. Werners, 2003)
Box 3.8 A compact overview of coastal zone problems 
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proportion is expected to rise to 4.7 per cent. Table 3.5
shows that in 1975 only five cities worldwide had 10
million or more inhabitants, of which three were in
developing countries. The global number will increase
to 21 by 2015, all but 4 of them in developing
countries. By then, Bombay, Dhaka, Lagos, and São
Paulo will each have over 20 million residents. Also by
2015 an estimated 564 cities around the world will
contain 1 million or more residents. Of these, 425 will
be in developing countries (Brockherrhof, 2000).
The potential impacts on megacity populations are:
– Increasing water insecurity because of drought or
unreliable and/or unevenly distributed rainfall;
– Increasing risks of flooding and water
contamination because of more frequent major
events like storms and rains;
– Increasing risks of flooding because of increasing
sea water level with direct impact in case of coastal
cities or inland cities that are located on rivers in
the lowlands.
Figure 3.5 The number of people at risk by the 2080s in coastal regions under the sea-level rise scenario and constant (1990s) protection, 
showing also the regions where coastal wetlands are most threatened by sea-level rise (Nicholls et al., 1997). 
1950 1975 2001 2015
city Pop. city Pop. city Pop. city Pop.
1. New York 12.3 1. Tokyo 19.8 1. Tokyo 26.5 1 . Tokyo 27.2
2. New York 15.9 2. Sao Paulo 18.3 2 . Dhaka 22.8
3. Shanghai 11.4 3. Mexico City 18.3 3 . Murnbai 22.6
4. Mexico City 10.7 4. New York 16.8 4 . Sao Paulo 21.2
5. Sao Paulo 10.3 5. Murnbai 16.5 5 . Delhi 20.9
6. Los Angeles 13.3 6 . Mexico City 20.4
7. Calcutta 13.3 7 . New York 17.9
8. Dhaka 13.2 8 . Jakarta 17.3
9. Delhi 13.0 9 . Calcutta 16.7
10. Shanghai 12.8 10. Karachi 16.2
11. Bunos Aires 12.1 11. Lagos 16.0
12. Jakarta 11.4 12. Los Angeles 14.5
13. Osaka 11.0 13. Shanghai 13.6
14. Beijing 10.8 14. Bunos Aires 13.2
15. Rio de Janeiro 10.5 15. Metro Manila 12.6
16. Karachi 10.4 16. Beijing 11.7
17. Metro Man ila 10.1 17. Rio de Janeiro 11.5
18. Caïro 11.5
19. Istanbul 11.4
20. Osaka 11.0
21. Tiajin 10.3
Figure 3.67 shows the current level of regional water
stress8 and the location of the twenty largest
megacities. In most cases there is a strong correlation
between areas with severe water stress and megacities
as major water consumers. For megacities in regions
already under water stress, future urban growth will
be restricted by the limited water availability. Only
Lagos, Buenos Aires, and Sao Paulo appear to escape
that constraint. To avoid overexploitation of the
natural river basins and to provide enough water for
industrial and domestic use, most of the megacities
import water from surrounding basins, at ever-
increasing cost. 
Figure 3.7 shows the same areas and megacities but
for water stress in the 2020s, under the IPCC A2
scenario, for ECHAM4 climate model. Increases in the
regional water stress under this climate change
scenario are evident. Also, with the notable exception
of Mexico City, the megacities are primarily located on
the coast. Depending upon topography and other
factors, some of the coastal cities may be particularly
vulnerable to sea level rises (see Table 3.6). The case of
Buenos Aires is presented in Box 3.9
Vulnerability of the urban poor to extreme events is
easy to see, but not so easy to quantify. As we have
seen repeatedly in this chapter, modelling future
patterns of climate variability is filled with
uncertainties. We know where the main risks are and
we can be sure that they will increase. For the people
involved, that is enough reason to act. As we will see
in Chapter 4, when communities are considering how
Table 3.5 Megacities
7 This map was originally produced for the World Water Assessment
Programme by the Center for Environmental System Research, Universiy of
Kassel, Germany 
8 withdrawal to availability ratio > 0.4
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Figure 3.6 Water stress in regions around selected megacities; current situation (Center for Environmental System Research, University of Kassel, Gemany)
Figure 3.7 Water stress in regions around selected megacities in the 2020s, under the IPCC A2 scenario, for ECHAM4 climate model in the 2020s SRES A2 
(Center for Environmental System Research, University of Kassel, Gemany)
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3.7 Developmental vulnerability:  
Millennium Goals
The United Nations Assembly Millennium Declaration
of September 2000 included the goal of halving by
2015 the proportion of people who do not have access
to, or cannot afford safe drinking water (See Box 3.
10). Recently at the 2002 WSSD, the goal of halving
the proportion of people without access to basic
sanitation by 2015 was added to the existing
Millennium Development Goal for water supply. To
meet the Millennium Development Goal water supply
target, an additional 1.6 billion people will require
access to safe water, and to halve the proportion of
people without access to adequate sanitation would
require that another 2.2 billion people be provided
with facilities by 2015 (Studer, Jamaleddin et al. 2002).
These goals present major challenges for all sectors of
the international community, and especially those
involved in water resources management and the
public health community. 
The Human Development Report ranks countries by
their human development index and by their status in
terms of achieving certain Millennium Development
targets. However, although a subset of the Millennium
targets (namely targets 1, 6 and 7) could be directly or
indirectly affected by climatic phenomena,   this
assessment does not take into account the affects of
future climate variability and change. The question is
posed: is it likely that the impacts of increased climate
variability and change alone will be significant enough
to hamper the achievement of the hunger, health and
water supply targets (targets 1, 6 and 7) in the year
2015? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, little can be said about the
magnitude of expected changes in climate variability
to adapt to changes in climate,
local perception of increasing
risk is often more important than
scientific proof of vulnerability.
Table 3.6 shows the current
situation and the climate-related
risks for three megacities
(Jakarta, Lagos and Buenos
Aires). Similar tabulation of risks
can be a helpful way of assessing
sensitivity to climate change. As
the CVI approach develops, it
may also be a way of evaluating
comparative vulnerabilities from
city to city. The first column of
the table shows the percentage
of households in each city
deemed to be below the
national poverty line – a proxy
for adaptive capacity.
10 http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/argent/natur.htm#freshw
Jakarta
Lagos
Buenos Aires
6.6
53
9.5
3% Central
Sewerage; septic
tanks; 
pit latrines
Public toilet,
pit latrine,
pour-flush,
WC+septic 
tank; sanitary
coverage :
94%
95% of sewage
dumped
untreated into
river; WC
sewerage covers
61%; septic
tanks; cess pools
35% of
households have
piped water,
water vendors,
deep well 
water
Water sellers,
yard taps,
Yard wells
standpipes,
piped indoor
~ 84%  piped
water; poorer
people in 
peri-urban 
areas have less
connections
Storm and flood
risks to low-cost
housing and
water and
sanitation
systems
Contamination
of water 
sources and
destruction 
of sanitation
infrastructure
Pollution of
water sources
and associated
health risks 
from floods
Sea level rise; 
salt water
intrusion; high
risk of future
water stress.
Sea level rise;
increased
flooding,
increased rainfall
variability; low
risk of future
water stress.
Sea level rise, 
salt water
intrusion;
increased 
rainfall
variability; low
risk of future
water stress.
Households
below 
Nat. poverty 
line in %
Coverage 
and types 
of 
sanitation
Types 
of 
water 
supply
Risks 
from 
climate 
extremes
Climate 
change 
related 
risks10
Table 3.6   Selected coastal megacities vulnerable to sea level rise (after Pahl-Wostl and Ridder, 2003)
The capital city of Argentina, Buenos Aires, currently has
a population of approximately 12.1 million people.
Buenos Aires is expected to continue growing at a rate
of about 0.6 percent per year, bringing population to
13.1 million by 2015 (UNDP).  Approximately, 85 percent
of Argentina’s urban population has access to improved
water resources, and 89 percent to improved sanitation
facilities. In particular, the peri-urban areas and the poor
have to rely on alternative water sources. Uncontrolled
sewage and wastewater, environmental degradation
and scarce water resources are major issues for Buenos
Aires. In addition, as a result of unrestricted
groundwater pumping, saltwater has begun to intrude
into one of the region’s largest reservoirs, the Puelche
aquifer. A number of wells have been forced to close.
This problem is exacerbated by sea-level rise, which can
increase saltwater intrusion, ultimately affecting the
supply of freshwater on the densely populated
metropolitan area. Despite this, the risk of future water
stress in and around Buenos Aires is comparably low
due to large amounts of surface water (Rio de la Plata)
and the rather low population growth. 
Over the past five years there have been major efforts
towards decentralisation and privatisation of the water
sector. Besides improvements in technical infrastructure,
initiatives were also taken to improve service delivery
through intermediary organisations targeting low
income people10. The decentralisation effort brought
planning activities closer to the people, aiding in the
long-term prospect of sustainability of the projects.
Several pilot projects were developed in effort to
provide the urban poor with a reliable water supply.
These projects incorporated social mapping techniques
to determine low income areas and their characteristics.
This information was used to adapt the technical design
and find solutions at lower costs. Despite these efforts,
price increases were high leading to high non-payment
rates for water and sanitation. In particular, the urban
poor refuse or are unable to pay the high water rates.
Box 3.9 The impact of climate change on water supply and 
sanitation of Buenos Aires 
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and change by the year 2015. And, factors other than
climate change, in particular a reduction in the
reliability of the water supply dominated by increases
in withdrawals, may in fact have a much larger impact
than changes in the vulnerability of the resource.  In
fact, it would be unrealistic to argue that the
magnitude of the mean changes in climate alone will
Target 1. Halve the proportion of people suffering
from hunger and living on less than USD
1 per day 
Targets 2 Ensure that all people can complete 
and 3. primary education: 
2. Net Primary enrolment ratio 
3. Children reaching grade 5
Targets 4 Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of 
and 5. education:
4. Female gross primary enrolment as 
% of male ratio 
5. Female gross secondary enrolment as 
% of male ratio
Target 6. Reduce under five and infant mortality
rates by two-thirds 
Target 7. Halve the proportion of people without
access to improved water sources
Box 3.10 Millennium Development Targets (Abridged) (HDR, 2002)
be significant enough to alter progress on achieving
the Millennium target of water supply in 2015.
Similarly, there is too much uncertainty to determine
whether or not the impacts of climate change will
reduce the effectiveness of achieving the Millennium
hunger target by 2015. However, based purely on
development paths, many countries are currently off-
track in terms of meeting this objective. 
Regardless of whether or not recent changes in climate
variability and in the magnitude and frequency of the
extreme climate events can be attributed to climate
change, an increase in the frequency and intensity of
extreme events is being observed (Chapter 1). Evidence
suggests that even small changes in the magnitude of
extreme climate events have an exponential effect on
losses. As illustrated by an example in Box 3.12, these
types of changes could have a seroius impact on
development agenda and could therefore derail the
achievement of any number of the Millennium targets.
3.8 Conclusions:  The limits of top-down 
assessments
Most vulnerability assessment methodologies described
in this chapter are representative of a "top-down"
approach. The aim of this type of approach is to
provide a comparative overview of regions that may
require special attention from the research and
development assistance community, under particular
scenarios. There are, however, several problems
The blue line in the figure shows the current policy objective for Nicaragua: to reduce the number of people in
extreme poverty. Those individuals living in extreme poverty are living on less than USD 1 per year. The Millennium
target for poverty is to halve the number of people living on less than USD 1 per day by the year 2015. The blue line
indicates that, in the absence of a catastrophe, GDP growth alone reduces the number of people in extreme poverty by
400,000 people by the year 2009, putting Nicaragua ahead of schedule in terms of achieving the Millennium target by
the year 2015. Analysis of the expected impact of the aftermath of the 1998 Hurricane Mitch catastrophe on the
number of people living in extreme poverty (shown by the solid line), indicate that for the decade following the
catastrophe the number of people in extreme poverty remains relatively high. In fact, the impacts on the poor may be
even higher if the poor suffer a disproportionate burden of the losses, as expected. A major issue in this analysis is the
incorporation of natural catastrophes into
broad planning. To avoid the outcome
described by the red line in the figure,
Freeman and Warner (2001) stress that the
impacts of natural catastrophes on the poor
need to be taken into consideration, and that
more assistance than is currently planned will
be required in order to meet poverty reduction
goals in the event of a catastrophe. Thus,
considering catastrophe impacts and poverty in
broad planning activities could help Nicaragua
achieve its poverty reduction measures, even
when a catastrophe occurs. If the impacts of
natural catastrophes are not considered, when
a catastrophe occurs, Nicaragua will not
achieve its poverty reducing objectives.
Box 3.11  The Impact of Natural Catastrophes on Number of People in Poverty in Nicaragua 
People in Extreme Poverty
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000
800,000
850,000
900,000
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
no catastrophes
catastrophes, no
additional aid
Changes in extreme poverty with and without the 1998 Hurricane Mitch 
catastrophe (Freeman and Warner, 2002)
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associated with global, top-down vulnerability
assessments.  
First, the resolution scale of most global analyses is
often too large to be used in identifying smaller areas
that may be highly vulnerable, such as small islands and
coastal areas.  Second, although they use the same
basic assumptions linking vulnerability to capacity and
development levels, they generally fail to encompass all
of the main impacts of climate change, and especially
climate variability.  As a result, for example,
Bangladesh, which has long been recognised as a
"climate change hot spot", does not appear to be
highly vulnerable under the majority of scenarios
presented above.  Third, these assessments are often
based only on projections of average climate conditions
(e.g., average annual precipitation). In reality, climate
variability poses a much greater threat to water
managers than do long term trends. Finally, the
outputs (maps) from these global analyses can detract
attention from highly vulnerable areas that may have
been missed.
Indeed, the vulnerability of water resources is primarily
manifested at the basin level – and that is where the
primary adaptation efforts must be aimed. It is also at
the community level that people are most aware of the
most appropriate adaptation measures. As will be
shown in the following chapter, awareness among
stakeholders is high and is growing rapidly.
"Top-down" methods are therefore best seen as a type
of sensitivity analysis that can complement "bottom-
up" studies of the vulnerability of particular
watersheds.
